University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
Liberal Democracy Nepal Bulletin

Nepal Study Center

6-18-2005

Mistakes, Miscalculations and the Search for
Middle Ground: An Exit Strategy for Nepal
Kul C. Gautam

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nsc_liberal_democracy
Recommended Citation
Gautam, Kul C.. "Mistakes, Miscalculations and the Search for Middle Ground: An Exit Strategy for Nepal." (2005).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nsc_liberal_democracy/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Nepal Study Center at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Liberal Democracy Nepal Bulletin by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact disc@unm.edu.

Liberal Democracy Nepal Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005

Mistakes, Miscalculations and the Search for Middle
Ground: An Exit Strategy for Nepal
Kul C. Gautam*

Although he may have had good intentions, King Gyanendra miscalculated the
effect of his draconian measures on February 1, 2005. The King and his advisors
miscalculated the capacity of the military, the response from the international
community, the effectiveness of loyalists, the appeal to Hindus, the role of China,
as well as attitudes towards corruption and censorship. In order to return to a
democratic path, a path that is also the only viable option for the survival of the
constitutional monarchy, Nepal’s three political protagonists – the King, the
Maoists, and the political parties – must compromise. An exit strategy is
possible, but it requires that these three protagonists put the interests of Nepal
above their own narrow, parochial interests.

King Gyanendra of Nepal is known to be an intelligent person who is
very knowledgeable about the current world situation. He should have known
that his imposition of emergency rule, suspension of civil liberties and other
draconian measures would be condemned by the international community and
would be controversial or even dangerous for the monarchy in Nepal.
So why did he do it? Did he have a hidden game plan?
It is conceivable that he took this extraordinarily risky and controversial
step out of profound concern for the nation and a genuine conviction that he had
a duty to act boldly and courageously. Due to the relentless Maoist violence and
the inability of the political parties to provide good governance, the country had
indeed reached a dire and critical point. The King could have genuinely felt it
was his obligation to unilaterally rescue the nation from a downward spiral of
senseless violence and endless political strife.
*

Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author in his personal capacity, and not
necessarily those of the United Nations or UNICEF.
Published by Nepal Study Center University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131, USA.

Liberal Democracy Nepal Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005

Though his approach has turned out to be flawed and ill-advised, the
propensity of the King to take bold action offers the hope that he could now be
equally daring and decisive in taking corrective action in the larger interest of the
nation.
But first, let us try to understand what led the King to take such a draconian step.
Based on informal feedback from a variety of actors in Nepal and
abroad, it appears that the King did indeed have a carefully crafted game plan.
However, it seems to have been largely based on wishful thinking by some of his
confidants and advisors. Two months into the royal coup d’etat, the game plan
has gone terribly awry and proven to be ill-advised.
Specifically, the King seems to have miscalculated on seven counts:
The Military. It appears that the King was advised by his military commanders
that if the Royal Nepalese Army had more operational freedom under a state of
emergency, it could quickly capture several top Maoist leaders. The capture of
their key leaders would lower the morale of the insurgents, crippling the rebel
movement or weakening it enough to entice it to a negotiated settlement. If this
happened, there would be a groundswell of popular support for the King from a
citizenry that is fed up with Maoist atrocities. The international community, too,
would appreciate and accept the King’s drastic measures as necessary to combat
terrorism. Unfortunately, this has not happened, as the military seems to have
grossly miscalculated its capabilities.
The Terrorists. The King knew that suspension of democracy and human rights,
censorship of the press, and military rule would be condemned by the
international community. However, since no foreign power wants the Maoists to
win, the intensification of the war against them could be presented as part of the
global war against terrorism. Given a choice between an authoritarian monarch
and the totalitarian and terrorist Maoists, the King and his supporters reckoned
that sooner or later the international community would choose the former. The
King often invoked the examples of support for Pakistan’s Musharraf and Peru’s
Fujimori. It may well be that international support for the King will come to pass
in due course, but the King miscalculated the appeal of this argument and was
surprised by the vehemence of opposition to his take-over by Nepal’s closest and
strongest donors and supporters.
The Loyalists. In plotting his coup, the King had reached out and enlisted the
support from some of the old guards from the Panchayat era of his father’s
absolute rule. Many of these old political cronies fill the King’s cabinet and serve
as his trusted advisers. While they may have been effective in the old days, it
turns out that their worldview is quite outdated, and their old tricks of political
manipulation no longer work. The King seems to have miscalculated the utility
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of the advice and support of these old loyalists. In one extreme case, a widely
despised personality who had literally been chased out of the country during the
heydays of the democratic people’s movement in 1990 has resurfaced in
Kathmandu in the King’s inner circle of advisers. His efforts to help the King
have already turned out to be counterproductive. Given the anti-democratic
credentials of several such loyalists, the King’s professed commitment to a multiparty democracy is viewed with suspicion and even disbelief.
The Hindus. Like his father King Mahendra, King Gyanendra is known to
consult Hindu astrologers and priests who assure him of divine blessings for his
activist role. As the world’s only Hindu monarch, the King of Nepal is known to
command the loyalty of many orthodox Hindus in India. Besides the divine
blessing and the endorsement of his decisive leadership, the King was apparently
led to believe that he could garner the support of Hindu nationalist politicians and
activists in Nepal as well as in India. Indeed, soon after the Royal coup d’etat,
and after the government of India had strongly condemned his actions, one of the
King’s new Ministers had telephoned the leader of the BJP party in India to seek
his support and solidarity as a Hindu co-religionist. Unfortunately, the King and
his supporters seem to have miscalculated that India’s secular political leaders
are very hesitant to in play the religious card in their foreign policy. Instead of
winning friends, the King’s invocation of religious solidarity seems to have
backfired.
China. In King Mahendra’s time, Nepal used to play “the China card” whenever
India became non-cooperative. Guided by the old-guard advisers, King
Gyanendra seems to have thought that in case India and other Western donors
became non-cooperative because of the King’s autocratic measures, he could turn
to China or Pakistan for military and financial support. The old guard seems to
have grossly miscalculated. The world in 2005 is very different from the world to
which they are accustomed, and China is unlikely to offend India, a country with
which it has substantial political, economic and trade relationships. For China,
the benefit of cultivating ties with Nepal’s autocrats is not worth the cost of
offending India and other Western powers.
Corruption. The people of Nepal are greatly disillusioned by the poor
governance, corruption and maladministration of the parliamentary political
parties and their leadership during the last decade. The King and his advisers
seem to have calculated that they would get much popular support if they took
stern action against these corrupt politicians and their henchmen. While there is
much support for the King’s counter-corruption measures, the fact that many of
the King’s loyalists too have shady reputations, and that these measures seem to
be politically motivated and of dubious legality, has undermined their credibility
and importance.
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Censorship. By initially cutting off all telecommunications and imposing strict
censorship of the media, the King and his advisers had hoped that opposition to
the royal rule would not coalesce and that the government would win the
propaganda war. In reality, the government has found out that in today’s world it
is impossible for any government to effectively cut off news and information,
especially from the well-to-do urbanites. The real impact of the clampdown on
the press has been that ordinary people in villages no longer get credible
information, including news of Maoist atrocities (or the military’s excesses).
Ironically, in some rural areas the void created by the ban on Nepal’s vibrant FM
radio stations has been filled by clandestine Maoist broadcasts.
In the light of these miscalculations, the King finds himself increasingly
isolated and ill-served by his loyalists. The country has become completely
polarised. On the one hand, many ordinary people, especially in Kathmandu,
genuinely welcome and support the King’s take-over as they value the peace and
quiet that has accompanied the state of emergency, After all, strikes,
demonstrations and disruption of services are banned. On the other hand,
political leaders, journalists, and human rights activists are strongly opposed to
the royal rule since they have been deprived of their democratic freedoms.
Outside Kathmandu, the situation has continued to deteriorate. Killing,
kidnapping, intimidation and extortion are rampant. To compound the Maoist
atrocities, the government troops have begun inciting vigilante violence and
innocent people, including women and children, are caught in the crossfire. The
Maoist blockades have disrupted transportation and trade, along with basic
services for and the livelihoods of millions of people.
Contrary to the King’s intentions, human security has definitely
deteriorated in the countryside. Out of fear and concern for personal security,
people feel compelled to choose between joining the Maoist “people’s
government” and the royal government’s camp. Many have chosen the Maoists
as they have a more effective and intimidating presence in the countryside than
the government. Genuine support for the Maoists is believed to be minimal and
declining, but the high-handedness of the Royal Nepalese Army is alienating the
populace.
Another unintended consequence of the King’s drastic step is that India
is now an even bigger player in Nepal’s politics. Both the UK and USA have said
that on matters concerning Nepal, they would not only coordinate their response
with that of India, but that they would look to India to take the lead. Thus, in
practice, New Delhi has become the capital of Nepal on matters pertaining to the
international response to Nepal’s political crisis. Having struggled over the last
five decades to establish itself as an independent country, and not an appendage
to India, this development is deeply disturbing to many Nepalis and friends of
Nepal.
Following the imposition of royal rule, both the Maoists and the
government have hardened their position with regard to a negotiated settlement
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of the conflict. It may well take many more casualties on both sides and
substantial international pressure before the two sides agree to negotiations.
Meanwhile, pro-republican sentiments are growing even among
mainstream political parties that have historically supported the constitutional
monarchy. The royal government maintains its hold on power only because of
the fear of Maoist extremism, the loyalty of the military to the King, and the
people’s disenchantment with ineffective and corrupt political parties.

What might be the exit strategy in this situation?
It is clear that there is no military solution to the crisis without incurring
horrific costs in human lives and infrastructure. It is also clear that the
international community will not allow or accept a Maoist take-over of the
country. Moreover, there is no return to the status quo ante of the pre-February 1
style of ineffective “democratic” governments. And it is clear that the King
cannot sustain an autocratic regime given both internal civil disobedience and the
real prospects for withdrawal or suspension of external assistance on which
Nepal is critically dependent.
All of Nepal’s three key political protagonists must therefore be
encouraged, supported and cajoled into finding a middle ground that harnesses
their best attributes, i.e., a respected constitutional monarchy as a symbol of
national unity, a progressive, populist, egalitarian socio-economic order as
espoused (but not always practised) by the Maoists, and a modern multi-party
democracy with a higher degree of accountability than has been the case in the
last decade.
Nepalese civil society, including those in the Diaspora, and friends of
Nepal in the international community must therefore continue to put pressure on
and offer inducements to these three protagonists for reconciliation between the
King and the political parties on the one hand, and for negotiations between the
government and the insurgents on the other hand.
It is in the best interest of Nepalis – including the Maoists, monarchists
and the democratic political parties – to seek a negotiated political settlement
around a shared common ground of democracy and respect for human rights and
international law if Nepal is to safeguard its independence and identity and build
a prosperous future.
Each of Nepal’s three key political forces – the King, the parties, and the
Maoists – have lost genuine public support in recent years, and will need to make
significant sacrifices to redeem themselves in a dignified manner in the eyes of
the Nepali people and friends of Nepal.
There is a serious credibility gap in the verbal commitments of Nepal’s
leaders. Meaningful actions are needed. For example, both the monarch and the
Maoists proclaim their faith in “genuine” democracy. But their actions tell a
different tale. The political parties promise good governance in their manifestos,
but tolerate corrupt behaviour by their leaders. This has to change.
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If the monarchy is to survive and thrive, the King will have to settle for
an honorary role as a constitutional monarch and be prepared to give up the reins
of power, including his direct control over the military.
The Maoists will have to give up violence as a legitimate instrument of
power and opt for the ballot rather than bullet, even as they peacefully pursue an
agenda of radical social reforms.
The political parties will have to reengineer themselves, bring truly
democratic practices into their internal working methods, bring out fresh,
untainted young leadership, and commit themselves to a strict “code of conduct”
to hold themselves accountable to high standards of integrity.
Although there is enough blame to go around and sully the reputation of
all three political protagonists, historians will undoubtedly hold the Maoists as
primarily responsible for wreaking the worst havoc in modern Nepal by trying to
impose a universally failed ideology that has inflicted unspeakable terror in the
land of Lord Buddha. Having achieved considerable success in the countryside,
the Maoists are now faced with the choice of either doggedly pursuing total
victory, which frankly is unachievable and unsustainable, or trying to cash in on
their strength and become an influential political party that champions the
populist cause of the poor and the downtrodden. If the Maoists continue to
miscalculate the people’s fearful acquiescence as genuine support, they will plant
the seeds of self-destruction. One hopes that they have the wisdom to learn from
world history and make the right choices at this critical juncture.
The King and his loyalists have fomented considerable disdain for the
political parties and their leaders by emphasizing the poor record of multi-party
democracy in the past decade. The charges of corruption, mismanagement, and
bickering for power and perks levelled against political parties are not untrue.
However, while some crooked leaders sullied politics at the national level,
Nepal’s short lived multi-party democracy was functioning relatively well at the
local level and was beginning to produce good results.
Besides, the value of democracy should be measured not only by the
performance of political leaders but also by the quality of civil society, as well as
the freedoms enjoyed by people to express their views and pursue their dreams.
And from that point of view, Nepal was actually on the right track, with the
exception of the Maoist aberration.
A functioning democracy tends to be self-correcting, as voters eventually
throw out irresponsible and unaccountable leaders by punishing them at the
ballot. From the point of view of modern monarchy, a functioning multi-party
democracy is the best guarantee for its survival as a truly respected institution, as
is evident from the world’s remaining constitutional monarchies. The King
should therefore invest his political capital in the multi-party democracy. If the
monarchy is to survive, it will be through democratic legitimacy not divine right
or military might.
But the biggest challenge and opportunity for rescuing Nepal from its
current predicament actually lies with the parliamentary political parties. They
must acknowledge that they have given democracy a bad name due to their
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maladministration and corruption, and they must take bold measures to exonerate
themselves from popular revulsion, a revulsion stoked by anti-democratic forces.
Given the cantankerous atmosphere of Nepal’s current politics, it would be very
patriotic for the senior leaders of the political parties, especially those who have
already had their chance to serve as heads of government, to gracefully step aside
or assume honorary advisory roles, and make room for younger leaders to
emerge.
The young, and thus far untainted leaders, must in turn reach across party
lines and collectively formulate stringent “codes of conduct” that they all agree to
abide by, no matter who is in the future government or administration.
Some elements of the code of conduct should be:
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Internal democracy and transparency in the functioning of political
parties;
Term limits for key leadership positions in political parties;
Fair representation of women and various geographic and ethnic groups
in leadership positions;
Democratising the selection process for election candidates, possibly
through “primary elections” or straw polls in electoral constituencies;
Requirement for leaders to disclose their own and their immediate family
members’ income, assets and tax payments on an annual basis, and
especially before and after assuming ministerial or senior constitutional
positions;
Appointment of ombudspersons within each party to investigate
allegations of corruption or misrepresentation of income and assets (e.g.
resources siphoned off to relatives, friends and business partners);
Disqualification of leaders from holding party or government positions
for a certain period when indicted for corruption or certain other serious
misconduct;
State financing of electoral campaigns, based on agreed criteria, and
limitation on private contributions for political parties and election
campaigns;
Provision of recalling elected leaders, under certain circumstances, if
their conduct betrays their campaign promises;
Commitment not to incite students and teachers in political campaigns or
by imposing non-academic demands on academic institutions;
Commitment not to politicise the civil service, the police and military
and the teaching profession’
Commitment to behave responsibly as a “loyal opposition” when out of
power.

If the political parties can come up with such a plan of action and code of
conduct, they might have a fighting chance to regain the confidence of the
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people. This plan could also be presented to the King as a new exit strategy rather
than asking him to just revert back to the status quo ante of pre-February 1, 2005,
an outcome which that could be humiliating to him and not very reassuring to the
Nepali people.
To provide constitutional legitimacy to the formation of a new, broadbased government representing the key parliamentary parties, serious
consideration should be given to temporary restoration of the dissolved
parliament, for an interim period, for certain specific tasks. Among these tasks
would be the initiation of peace talks with the Maoists.
As a prelude to the peace talks, the political parties must come up with a
politically clear, unified and consistent position on the Maoist insurgency and its
resolution. They should, in fact, draft a framework agreement, which might
include some non-negotiable propositions, such as respect for universal human
rights, a pluralistic, multi-party democracy, and some form of a truly
constitutional monarchy. There should then be a series of negotiable options for
consideration on other matters of statecraft or policies, e.g., the precise powers of
the King, the command structure of the military, whether we should consider a
federal structure of government, mixed proportional representation, protection of
minority rights, a bi-cameral versus a unicameral parliament, direct election of
the Prime Minister, structure of local governments, etc.
Efforts should be made to find enough common ground with aspects of
the Maoist socio-economic, and political agenda that are compatible with
internationally acceptable principles and norms of democracy, rule of law and
human rights. For example, ways can be found to accommodate the Maoist
demand of a round-table conference, an interim government and some form of
constituent assembly that is consistent with the above principles.
As all three of Nepal’s political protagonists have something good to
offer the people of Nepal, the peace process should allow for all parties to save
face. We want the Nepali people to be the ultimate winners, without any of the
political protagonists feeling vanquished or humiliated.
Ultimately, the Nepalis themselves have to find enough common ground
to end the conflict and usher in a new era of peace, democracy, and development.
However, given the deep lack of trust among the various Nepali protagonists, it
seems desirable that a respected, neutral external organization or a friendly
country or consortium of countries should facilitate the peace and reconciliation
process.
There have been many offers of help from organizations like the United
Nations, the Carter Center, the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue,
the European Union, and several friendly countries. All of these groups can offer
some useful support. But the United Nations might perhaps be the most helpful in
that its support can encompass not just helping with political negotiations but
also in devising and supporting plans for disarmament and demobilisation,
election monitoring, post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation, human rights
promotion and institution of “truth and reconciliation” mechanisms that will be
needed to heal the deep scars of injury and injustice left by the conflict.
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Nepalis and friends of Nepal must press for such a plan of political
reconciliation and a negotiated settlement of the conflict to get the country out of
its current tragic impasse.
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